Prejudgment Interest: Implementing Its Compensatory Purpose by Martin, Michael J.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 15
Issue 3 Spring 1984 Damages Symposium Article 7
1984
Prejudgment Interest: Implementing Its
Compensatory Purpose
Michael J. Martin
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael J. Martin, Prejudgment Interest: Implementing Its Compensatory Purpose, 15 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 541 (1984).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol15/iss3/7
Prejudgment Interest: Implementing Its
Compensatory Purpose
INTRODUCTION
As an element of damages, prejudgment interest compensates
a plaintiff for lost earnings due to his inability to use money
owed to him but not paid by the defendant during the pendency
of litigation. Prejudgment interest is an adjustment that converts
damages as measured at the time of the accident into damages
as measured at the time of judgment.1 The concept is based on
the inherent earning power of money over time.
Whether Illinois courts should award prejudgment interest as
an element of damages in all tort cases has been much debated
between plaintiffs' bar and defendants' bar.2 Currently, by stat-
ute, Illinois allows prejudgment interest only on claims for
money due on written instruments, or where there has been
unreasonable or vexatious delay.3 Illinois courts have consis-
tently refused to award prejudgment interest on claims not
within the scope of this statute.4 Plaintiffs' bar, however, has
1. A judgment for past damages only reflects damages incurred at the time of the loss.
Where a judgment is not obtained until years after the deprivation, prejudgment interest
provides an adjustment to compensate for the lost opportunity to invest this sum. See
Note, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw U.L. REV. 192 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Londrigan, The Case For ... Prejudgment Interest, 72 ILL B.J. 62 (1983);
Smith, The Case Against... Prejudgment Interest, 72 ILL B.J. 71 (1983).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, 6402 (1983) provides:
Creditors shall be allowed to receive at the rate of five (5) percent per annum for
all moneys after they become due on any bond, bill, promissory note, or other
instrument of writing; on money lent or advanced for the use of another; on
money due on the settlement of account from the day of liquidating accounts
between the parties and ascertaining the balance; on money received to the use
of another and retained without the owner's knowledge; and on money with-
held by an unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment.
4. See, e.g., Lakefront Realty v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415,167 N.E.2d 236 (1960); Blakeler's
Warehouses v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 17 N.E.2d 1 (1938); Turk v. City of Chicago,
352 Ill. 171, 185 N.E. 258 (1933); Geohegan v. Union Elevated R.R., 266 Ill. 483, 107 N.E.
786 (1915); Harvey v. Hamilton, 54 Ill. App. 507 (1894), affirmed, 155 Il. 377, 40 N.E. 592
(1895); Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 51 111. App. 3d 568, 366 N.E.2d 561 (1977); Hamilton
v. American Gage & Mach. Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 845, 342 N.E.2d 758 (1976); Gonzalez v.
Donaher, 30 111. App. 3d 992, 332 N.E.2d 603 (1975); Weiland Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Whitney,
100 111. App. 2d 116, 241 N.E.2d 533 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 44 Ill. 2d 105, 251
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urged the Illinois legislature to become one of an increasing
number of states allowing prejudgment interest in personal injury
and wrongful death actions. 5 Defendants' bar has thus far suc-
cessfully lobbied against proposed legislation that would extend
the present scope of actions in which prejudgment interest is allowed. 6
This note will examine whether Illinois courts should award
prejudgment interest as an element of damages in causes of
action arising in tort. First, prejudgment interest awards will be
discussed in light of the compensatory purpose of tort damages.
Second, the arguments for and against prejudgment interest
awards in tort cases will be examined in light of the goals of
compensatory damages. This note will then present and analyze
the Illinois judicial and statutory positions on prejudgment inter-
est. A set of general guidelines will be developed for assessing
the fairness of prejudgment interest statutes, and two pieces of
legislation analyzed using these guidelines: the existing Colo-
rado statute and the recently proposed Illinois legislation. Finally,
this note proposes three statutory options to aid Illinois legisla-
tors in drafting a prejudgment interest statute that conforms to
the purpose of prejudgment interest as an element of compensa-
tory damages.
AN OVERVIEW OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Tort Damages as Compensation
The primary purpose of awarding damages in tort proceedings
is to place the injured party in a position as close as possible to
his position prior to the commission of the tort.7 The law thus
imposes monetary damages in satisfaction of the plantiff's loss
N.E.2d 242 (1969).
5. See infra notes 36-39.
6. See Smith, supra note 2, at 71.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1979). See also United States v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 547 F.2d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 1977); 543 F.2d 657, 667 (9th
Cir. 1976); Pullman Co. v. Lutz, 154 Ala. 517, 518, 45 So. 675, 676 (1908); Fisher v. City of
Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1965); Hughett v. Caldwell County, 311 Ky. 85, 88, 230
S.W.2d 92, 96 (1950); Genslinger v. Illinois Athletic Club, 339 Ill. 426, 443, 171 N.E. 514,
521 (1930); Alton & S.R. Co. v. Alton Transp. Co., 79 M1. App. 3d 591, 594, 399 N.E.2d 173,
175 (1980); Devon Bank v. Schindler, 72 Ill. App. 3d 147, 154, 390 N.E.2d 447, 452 (1979);
Roark v. Musgrave, 41 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1011, 355 N.E.2d 91, 94 (1976); Superior Constr.
Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 2, 104 A.2d 581,582 (1954); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ToRTs § 1 (4th ed. 1971).
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or injury, with the ultimate goal of total compensation. Hence,
compensatory damages are referred to as "actual damages."8 Illi-
nois courts have stated that the purpose of such damages is to
make the injured party whole.9 The compensatory purpose of
tort damages places a ceiling on plaintiffs recovery. Absent
aggravating circumstances accompanying the defendant's inju-
rious conduct,10 a plaintiff is entitled to a just and adequate com-
pensation, but no more.1' It is not the purpose of compensatory
damages to punish the defendant or to bestow a windfall upon
the plaintiff.12
In general economic usage, the payment of interest compen-
sates for the use, detention, or forbearance of money. 13 Interest
as an element of damages would compensate plaintiff for delay
in the payment of a fixed sum or delay in the assessment and
payment of damages. 14 Hence, courts award predjugment inter-
est to compensate plaintiff for the loss of the use of money due
him from the date of injury until the date of judgment.16
8. See Illinois C.R. Co. v. Crail, 281 U.S. 57, 63 (1930); Genslinger v. Illinois Athletic
Club, 339 Ill. 426, 443, 171 N.E. 514, 521 (1930); Brewster v. VanLiew, 119 Ill. 554, 562, 8
N.E. 842, 846 (1886); Wanderer v. Plainfield Carton Corp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 552, 556, 351
N.E.2d 630, 635 (1976); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 925,
935-37, 316 N.E.2d 51, 61-63 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Santiemmo v. Days Transfer, Inc., 9 Ill. App. 2d 487, 502, 133 N.E.2d 539,
547 (1956).
10. Aggravating circumstances, such as wantonness, willfulness, malice, fraud, or
violence, may support a claim for additional damages in the form of punitive damages.
Anvil Inv. Ltd. v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1119, 407 N.E.2d
645, 646 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of DesPlaines v. Amco Eng'g Co., 32 Ill. App. 3d 451,
455, 335 N.E.2d 591, 594 (1975); Wetmore v. Ladies of Loretto, Wheaton, 73 Ill. App. 2d
454, 467, 220 N.E.2d 491, 498 (1966); City of Chicago v. Shayne, 46 Ill. App. 2d 33, 38, 196
N.E.2d 521, 524 (1964); Madison v. Wigal, 18 Ill. App. 2d 564, 571, 153 N.E. 2d 90, 94
(1958).
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
12. Genslinger v. New Ill. Athletic Club of Chicago, 339 Ill. 426, 443, 171 N.E. 514,521
(1930); Wanderer v. Plainfield Carton Corp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 552, 556, 351 N.E.2d 630, 635
(1976); 349 W. Ontario Bldg. Corp. v. Palmer Truck Leasing Co., 22 Ill. App. 3d 467,
477-78, 317 N.E.2d 740 (1974).
13. People ex rel Empress Farms v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 13 Ill. App. 3d 327,
328, 300 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1973); Tracey v. Shanley, 311 Ill. App. 529, 534, 36 N.E.2d 753, 756
(1941). See also 45 AM. JuR, 2D Interests § 1 (1969).
14. C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 50 (1935). See also Kishi v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 10
F.2d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 1926); Haas v. Cravatta, 71 Ill. App. 3d 325, 332, 389 N.E.2d 226,
231 (1979).
15. Brinkeihoff v. Swearingen Aviation Corp., 663 P.2d 937, 942 (Alaska 1983); Se-
bring v. Colver, 649 P.2d 932, 936 (Alaska 1982); Davis v. Chism, 513 P.2d 475, 481
(Alaska 1973); Haas v. Cravatta, 71 Ill. App. 3d 325, 332,389 N.E.2d 226, 231 (1979).
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The Debate Over Prejudgment Interest in Tort Damages
The awarding of prejudgment interest as an element of tort
damages has engendered continuing legal debate. On the one
hand are those who advocate expanding the scope of those
causes of action in which prejudgment interest may be awarded.
They present a two-fold argument. 16 First, they claim that pre-
judgment interest is necessary to fully compensate the plaintiff.17
This argument, which may be termed the "compensatory
approach," reasons that, because the injured party is entitled to
be made whole as of the moment the cause of action accrued,
any delay in the receipt of compensaton should itself be compen-
sable.18 Delay results in two distinct injuries: first, the lost use of
the money due during the pendency of the claim; 19 and, second,
the loss occasioned by paying yesterday's debt with today's
inflated dollar.20 This argument thus advocates an expansion of
the scope of prejudgment interest so as to compensate for the
financially detrimental consequences of a time consuming judi-
cial process in an inflationary economy.
Closely related to the compensation approach is a restitution
argument. Defendant is, in effect, unjustly enriched by retaining
funds theoretically due plaintiff during the pendency of the
claim and in having the freedom to invest them and reap their
fruits without charge.2' Defendant should, therefore, be required
to disgorge the benefits derived from his inequitable detention of
funds.22 Another related argument views plaintiff as having
effectively subsidized defendant's investments during the pen-
dency of the claim, and, in so doing, incurring costs himself.23
This theory maintains that defendant's withholding of money
16. See Londrigan, supra note 2, at 62.
17. See supra notes 7, 8, and accompanying text.
18. State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 272 (Alaska 1970). This argument reasons that
although, the award for delay is in the nature of interest, in actuality it is an extension of
the compensatory purpose of tort damages. For the proposition that, in Illinois, a wrong-
ful death action vests immediately upon death, see Watson v. Fischbach, 54 Ill. 2d 498,
301 N.E.2d 303 (1973).
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. Inflation decreases the purchasing power of the present dollar compared to past
dollars; therefore money awarded is worth less the later it is received. Hare & Meelheim,
Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury Litigation; A Policy of Fairness, 5 AM. J. TRIAL
ADv. 81, 87 (1981).
21. Id. at 89.
22. Id.
23. See Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Div. of Nat'l Lead Co., 358 Mich. 510, 513, 100
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during the disputed claim may have caused plaintiff to raise
funds for interim needs, thereby incurring a conventional inter-
est charge. 24 Prejudgment interest would compensate plaintiff
for those interest charges.
The second major argument urged by advocates of expanding
the awarding of prejudgment interest in tort cases may be
referred to as the "judicial efficiency approach." This argument
asserts that defendants have a financial incentive to delay if
they can continue to earn and retain interest on funds that are
due to plaintiff but will not be awarded until some time in the
future. Requiring defendant to pay plaintiff an amount equiva-
lent to this prejudgment interest will, it is argued, remove this
incentive for the defendant to delay the disposition of a case.25
Elimination of an incentive to prolong disposition of the case
and the corresponding encouragement to settle claims prior to
trial, it is asserted, may reduce the number of civil cases on an
already crowded court docket 26 and facilitate the expeditious
disposition of those cases proceeding to trial.27 Improved case
flow management, this argument concludes, would ultimately
benefit plaintiffs and defendants alike.
On the other hand, the opponents of expanding the applica-
tion of prejudgment interest to all tort claims reject these argu-
ments. They rely instead primarily on the common law require-
ment that prejudgment interest be awarded only when the claim
is liquidated or readily ascertainable. 28 This common law require-
ment is one of basic fairness, it is argued, which limits awards of
N.W.2d 226, 229 (1960). See also Note, Recovery of Prejudgment Interest on an Unliqui-
dated State Claim Arising Within the Sixth Circuit, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 155 (1977).
24. See Note, supra note 23, at 155.
25. See Hare & Meelheim, supra note 20, at 90; Wolf & Evans, A Case for Allowance
of Prejudgment Interest in Reference to Wrongful Death Cases, 17 TRIAL LAW GUIDE 302,
308 (1973).
26. A 1982 study concluded that the average time from the filing of a complaint to its
disposition by jury verdict within the Law Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Ill., was 51.9 months. Approximately 90% of all cases filed in the division were tort
claims, and 85% of all cases were deemed not to involve complex issues or substantial
monetary exposure. The study concluded, based in part on these statistics, that litigation
was taking too long and costing too much. Report of the Committee to Study Case Flow
Management in the Law Division 5 (Jan. 8, 1982).
27. See Hare & Meelheim, supra note 20, at 89; Note, supra note 1, at 194.
28. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, §§ 54-56. For an analysis of the common law
treatment of prejudgment interest, see Note, Prejudgment Interest; An Element of Full
Compensation in Wrongful Death Cases, 1981 ILL LF. 453.
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interest to those cases where defendant actually has the option
to pay a known amount, thereby stayiqg the accrual of inter-
est.29 To award prejudgment interest in those other cases where
the amount of the claim is disputed, and thus where this option
does not exist, penalizes defendant for disputing damages in
good faith.30 Defendant is put in the unfair position of being
assessed further damages for exercising his right to have a jury
assess his liability.31
Opponents of extending the awarding of prejudgment interest
to all tort cases also claim that juries already implicitly award
prejudgment interest in their verdicts. 32 Hence, to award addi-
tional interest would result in a windfall to plaintiff and a
penalty to defendant. 33
Third, and finally, opponents of extending prejudgment inter-
est insist that awarding such interest in all tort cases will not
remedy the problem of protracted litigation and court backlogs.
On the contrary, awarding prejudgment interest damages may
actually make the situation worse by providing plaintiff with a
financial incentive to delay.34 Plaintiff would be rewarded for
procrastinating in the filing of his action and perpetuating the
action once filed.35
29. See supra note 28.
30. See Note, Judgments: Interest on Judgments-Limitation on Recovery of Pre-
judgment Interest, 56 MINN. L. REV. 739, 740 (1972).
31. If the sum claimed as damages is not ascertainable by reasonable computation,
defendant does not know the extent of his liability. Therefore, he cannot discharge the
debt and thereby end the accrual of interest owed by him. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5, at 173 (1973).
32. See Carroll, Jury Awards and Prejudgment Interest In Tort Cases, A Rand Corpor-
ation Note (N-1994-ICJ May 1983) (prepared for the Institute for Civil Justice). This study
stated that juries in Cook County, Ill., were implicity awarding prejudgment interest in
tort actions. The conclusion was based on an analysis of jury awards from 1960-79,
which were found to have been increasing over and above inflation by a rate of 3.7% per
year.
33. Id. See also Smith, supra note 2, at 74.
34. This argument may have greater merit as the rate of interest awarded increases
relative to available market rates.
35. One commentator has cited Colorado's prejudgment interest statute, COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-101 (1982), to support this contention. Prior to the statute, Colorado provided
for interest to run from the date of filing of the lawsuit. The statute was amended in 1982
to provide for interest to accrue from the time the cause of action arose. The commentator
concluded that because the interest was applied to all damages, the plaintiff was over-
compensated and thus benefitted from delay. See Note, Prejudgment Interest as an Ele-
ment of Damages: Proposed Solutions for a Colorado Problem, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 335,
341-50 (1978).
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The foregoing arguments for and against awarding prejudg-
ment interest in all tort cases have been accorded varying levels
of deference in different jurisdictons, resulting in a variety of
statutory provisions. 36 Some jurisdictions limit the causes of
action for which prejudgment interest may be awarded.37 Others
allow prejudgment interest in all cases where applicable. 3 Further,
statutory provisions may differ as to the date on which the inter-
est begins to accrue and as to what the rate itself should
be.39 Michigan, for example, permits prejudgment interest at a
rate of six percent in all civil actions, calculated from the date of
filing of the complaint.40 Oklahoma, on the other hand, awards
fifteen percent interest in civil actions for the period of time
36. Fifteen states currently have general prejudgment interest statutes: Alaska, ALASKA
STAT. §§ 9.50.280, 45.45.010 (1983) (10.5% interest running from the date the cause of
action accrued); California, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3291 (West 1982) (10% interest running from
the date of plaintiffs first subjudgment settlement offer); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-21-101 (Supp. 1980) (9% interest running from the date the cause of action accrued);
Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 636-16, 478-2 (1976) (6% interest running from the time
judge designates, but not earlier than the date when the injury first occurred); Iowa, IOWA
CODE § 535.3 (1982) (10% interest running from the date of commencement of the action);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4203 (West 1982) (7% interest running from the date the
complaint is filed); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1602 (1982) (8% interest running
from the date the complaint is filed); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 6B
(West 1983) (12% interest running from the date the action is commenced); Michigan,
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.6013 (Supp. 1983) (5% interest running from the date the action is
filed); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524:1.b (1981) (8% interest running from
the date the cause of action is filed); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (Supp. 1983)
(15% interest running from the date the suit is commenced); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 9.21-10 (1980) (8% interest running from the time the cause of aciton accrued); Utah,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-44 (1983) (8% interest running from the time the cause of action
accrued); Virginia, VA. CODE § 8.01-382 (1983) (permits trier of fact to award interest in
any action in law or in equity); Wisconsin, WISC. STAT. § 807.01 (1983) (14% interest run-
ning from the date the plaintiff's settlement offer is refused, provided that the offer is less
than the eventual judgment amount).
In addition, states may legislate prejudgment interest into statutes for particular
causes of action. See, e.g., MD. CTS. JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1602 (1983) (automobile
liability claims; statute also provides for such interest where the defendant has unneces-
sarily delayed disposition of a case). Two states have adopted prejudgment interest by
court rules rather than by legislative enactment: New Jersey, N.J. SuP. CT. R. 4:42-11(b)
(6% interest running from the date of commencement of the suit, or six months after the
tort, whichever is later); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. (Purdon 1982) (10% interest
running from the date the action is filed, or one year after the accrual of the cause of
action is filed, or one year after the accrual of the cause of action, whichever is later).
37. See supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.6013 (Supp. 1983).
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between the commencement of the suit and the judgment.41 North
Carolina allows six percent interest to accrue from the time the
action is filed, but only if the sum of damages is readily ascer-
tainable or liquidated.42
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN ILLINOIS
The courts and legislature in Illinois have consistently opposed
expanding the awarding of prejudgment interest. The Illinois
statutory provision for prejudgment interest is very restrictive,
authorizing a rate of interest of only five percent, and then only
in two situations.43 The first is for creditors' causes of action on
debts created by written instruments44 and liquidated accounts,45
i.e., actions based on contracts where the sum claimed as dam-
ages is readily ascertainable. The second is for claims for money
unreasonably withheld, regardless of the theory under which the
cause of action is brought.46
Illinois courts have interpreted the statute strictly. As long ago
as 1900, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Beach v. Peabody,47 de-
clared that interest damages were a "creature of statute" and
that Illinois courts should therefore grant such damages only
41. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727 (1982).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1981).
43. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 17, § 6402 (1981). See supra note 3 for text of statute.
44. See West Chicago Alcohol Work v. Charles Sheer, 104 Ill. 586, 590 (1882).
45. See, e.g., Lepman & Heggie v. Inter-State Produce, 205 Ill. App. 270, 271 (1917).
The court stated that damages are said to be liquidated when the amount of damages can
be determined from the contract itself or from the contract and rules of law applicable
thereto. Unliquidated damages, the court went on to state, are damages that require the
introduction of further evidence before the plaintiff can prove his case. See also In Re
Silver, 109 F. Supp. 200, 204 (E.D. Ill. 1952), affirmed, 204 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1953); Clark
v. Dutton, 69 Ill. 521, 523 (1873).
46. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 17, § 6402 (1981). Some commentators recognize that the pur-
pose of awarding interest is to compensate plaintiff for lost use of money. Courts should
not be concerned with defendant's motives in denying plaintiff the use of this money due
him, for if there is a compensable injury, it is due regardless of the motivation behind the
injury. The language of the statute, particularly "unreasonable and vexatious," may be
more consistent with language which delineates elements of punitive damages. Punitive
damages go beyond compensation, to which interest contributes, to penalize the defend-
ant for his wrongful acts, and to act as a deterrent to others. See, e.g., J. STEIN, DAMAGES
AND RECOVERY § 182, at 356 (1972). For an analysis of the purpose of punitive damages in
Illinois, see Silver Mfg. Co. v. General Box Co., 76 Ill. 2d 413, 392 N.E.2d 1343 (1979);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Mattvasovsky v. West
Towns Bus Co., 61 111. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
47. 188 Ill. 75, 58 N.E. 679(1900).
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where so authorized. 48 Consistent with that holding, Illinois
courts have since restricted prejudgment awards to those situa-
tions expressly provided for by statute.49 Thus, although the first
clause in the Illinois statute authorizing interest for debts "or
other instruments of writing" can be read as potentially expan-
sive, the statute has been interpreted under the doctrine of "ejus-
dem generis."50 Consequently, its application has been limited to
those writings which themselves create a legal indebtedness and
carry a specific or inherent due date.5 1 For example, Illinois
courts have held writings in confirmation of the sale or purchase
of securities, 52 building contracts, 53 and contractors' perfor-
mance bonds 54 to be within the scope of the statute, but have
held that a letter confirming a n oral contract for services did not
create a legal indebtedness itself, and therefore was not an
instrument within the purview of the statute.55
Judicial interpretation of the statute has also limited the use of
the "unreasonable and vexatious delay" clause as a justification
for granting prejudgment interest. It is not sufficient that a
defendant's defense is drawn out and time consuming; courts
require a showing of contrivance on defendant's part that approx-
imates fraud.56 The burden is even greater when the plaintiff is
a creditor who has delayed bringing suit to collect the debt. In
order for such a creditor-plaintiff to collect interest damages
48. Id. at 79, 58 N.E. at 680.
49. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50. See Hamilton v. American Gage Mach. Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 845, 853, 342 N.E.2d
758, 763 (1976). "Ejusdem generis" means that general words must be construed to
include only things of the same kind as those indicated by the particular and specific
words. Bullman v. City of Chicago, 367 Ill. 217, 226, 10 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1973). In the
context of § 6402, the doctrine of ejusdem generis limits the application of prejudgment
interest to writings that themselves create an indebtedness and possess the same legal
attributes as bonds, bills, and promissory notes.
51. See, e.g., Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v. Englehardt, Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d 252, 263-64,414
N.E.2d 941,950 (1980); Reserve Ins. Co. v. General Ins. Co., 77 Ill. App. 3d 272, 284-85, 395
N.E.2d 933, 940-41 (1979).
52. See Martin v. Orvis Bros., 25 Ill. App. 3d 238, 251,323 N.E.2d 73, 83(1974).
53. See John Kubinski & Sons. Inc. v. Dockside Dev. Corp., 33 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1023,
339 N.E.2d 529, 536 (1975).
54. See Griffin Wellpoint Corp. v. Englehardt, Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d 252, 263-64, 414
N.E.2d 941, 950 (1980). See also Kalalinick v. Knoll, 97 Ill. App. 3d 660, 669, 422 N.E.2d
1011, 1018 (1981).
55. Hamilton v. American Gage & Mach. Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 845, 342 N.E.2d 758
(1976).
56. Id. at 853, 342 N.E.2d at 765; Kespohl v. Northern Trust Co., 131 I1. App. 2d 188,
191, 266 N.E.2d 371, 374 (1970).
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under this section of the statute, he must show that his delay
was induced by the debtor's own circumvention or management,
or that the debtor had "thrown obstacles" in the way of collection. 57
Furthermore, Illinois case law has added to the statutory pro-
visions a judicial requirement that the basic damages sum be
liquidated or subject to easy computation before a party will be
entitled to recover prejudgment interest.58 This requirement has
effectively limited the recovery of interest to actions where the
relationship of debtor and creditor could be said to exist between
the parties.59 The mere fact that parties may reasonably dis-
agree as to their liability does not, however, preclude the award
of prejudgment interest under this statute, provided that the
amount owed is readily ascertainable. 60
Illinois courts uniformly deny prejudgment interest claims in
actions outside of the limited statutory provision.61 Thus, pre-
judgment interest has been denied in both personal injury actions
and in wrongful death actions arising under the Illinois Wrong-
ful Death Act.62 The Wrongful Death Act contains broad lan-
guage concerning "fair and just compensation," but does not
expressly authorize prejudgment interest as an element of dam-
ages. 63 Strict judicial reading of this statute allows recovery only
for proven pecuniary losses64 claimed by authorized parties,65 the
57. See Woodruff v. City of Chicago, 394 Ill. 542, 551, 69 N.E.2d 287, 293 (1946); Hitt v.
Allen, 13 Ill. 592, 596 (1852); Kespohl v. Northern Trust Co., 131 Ill. App. 2d 188, 191, 266
N.E.2d 371,374 (1970).
58. See, e.g., North Shore Marine, Inc. v. Engle, 81 Ill. App. 3d 530, 531, 401 N.E.2d
269, 273(1980).
59. Watson Lumber Co. v. Guennewig, 79 Ill. App. 2d 37, 266 N.E.2d 270 (1967).
60. Chicago & E.I.R. Co. v. Martin Bros. Container & Timber Prods. Corp., 87 ll. App.
3d 327, 332-33, 408 N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (1980).
61. See supra note 4-and accompanying text.
62. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, 2 (1981). Paragraph 2 provides, in relevant part:
Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal repre-
sentatives of such deceased person, and, except as otherwise hereinafter pro-
vided, the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased person and in every such
action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just com-
pensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to
the wife and next of kin of such deceased person....
63. Id.
64. See Rusher v. Smith, 70 Ill. App. 3d 889, 893, 388 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1979); Kaiser-
man v. Bright, 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 70, 377 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1978).
65. In enacting the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, the legislature intended to create a
cause of action for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's spouse and next of kin. This
intention precludes an insurer's subrogation action on the basis of a wrongful death
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courts once again deferring to the legislature to authorize an
expansion of the scope of prejudgment interest for these actions.66
Future Damages Awards
Standing in contrast with the hard line taken in Illinois
against awarding prejudgment interest on past damages is
Illinois' position on future damages.67 Future damages are those
losses plaintiff has not yet suffered, but reasonably anticipates,
by virtue of the tortious injury.68 For example, in case of a negli-
gence suit for partial disability, plaintiff's past damages might
include hospital bills and other expenses already incurred. Plain-
tiff's future damages, by contrast, would include claims for
reduced earning power or ongoing medical care over the next
several years.
Illinois courts recognize future damages as compensable, but
they discount to present cash value the amount a defendant
must pay.69 Courts recognize that some of a plaintiffs antici-
pated losses will not occur for many months or years. To require
award. See National Bank of Bloomington v. Podgorski, 57 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268, 373
N.E.2d 82, 84 (1978).
66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
67. See Allendorf v. Elgin J. & E.R. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 165, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956); Advance
v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N.E.2d 57 (1944); Howard v. Gulf, M. & O.R. Co., 13 Ill. App.
2d 482, 142 N.E.2d 825 (1957).
68. See Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hosp., 120 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1069, 458 N.E.2d
1072, 1079 (1983); Jurney v. Lubeznik, 72 Ill. App. 2d 117, 130, 218 N.E.2d 799,805 (1966).
69. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION No. 34.02 (West 1971) provides:
In computing the damages arising in the future [because of injuries] [because of
future (medical) (caretaking) expenses] [or] [because of the loss of future earn-
ings] you must not [simply multiply the damages (by the length of time you
have found they will continue) (or) (by the number of years you have found that
the plaintiff is likely to live)]. Instead, you must determine their present cash
value. "Present cash value" means the sum of money needed now, which, when
added to what the sum may reasonably be expected to earn in the future, will
equal the amount of the [damages] [expenses] [and] [earnings] at the time in the
future when [the damage from the injury will be suffered] [the expenses must be
paid] [or] [the earnings would have been received]. Damages for [pain and suf-
fering] [disability] [and] [disfigurement] are not reduced to present cash value.
In wrongful death cases, No. 34.03 provides:
If you find for the plaintiff, then in assessing damages you may consider how
long the [widow] [and] [next of kin] would be likely to have received pecuniary
benefits from the decedent, considering how long he was likely to have lived
and how long [she] [they] are likely to live.
In calculating the amount of these pecuniary benefits you must not simply mul-
tiply the life expectancies by the annual benefits. Instead, you must determine
their present cash value. "Present cash value" means the sum of money needed
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defendant to compensate plaintiff for such losses now gives
plaintiff a windfall: the use of money before it is technically
due.70 The interest earned on that money in the interim between
judgment and the actual accrual of plaintiffs future damages
rightfully belongs not to the plaintiff, but to the defendant.
Courts in Illinois accordingly adjust downward the judgment
against the defendant to an amount that, when added to the
interest such amount would earn in the period between judgment
and the realization of the future loss, will equal the amount of
the actual loss when realized at that future date.71 In one sense,
this form of "postjudgment interest award" to defendant is the
mirror image of prejudgment interest to plaintiff.72
Illinois courts have neither noted nor explained the apparent
inconsistency of bestowing upon defendants, but not plaintiffs,
the benefit of discounting. The Illinois courts are thus in the
anomolous position of allowing to a defendant a credit for his
"prepayment" of debts not yet owed, but at the same time not
debiting him for the postponed payment of debts he has already
incurred. Rather than address the problem directly, Illnois courts
have deferred to the legislature, summarily rejecting all claims for
recovery of prejudgment interest absent statutory authorization. 73
Federal Interpretation of Prejudgment Interest in Illinois
A single federal court decision stands as an exception to the
generally accepted interpretation of Illinois law on prejudgment
interest. In 1979, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois, in consolidated pretrial proceedings in In
Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago,74 recognized prejudgment
interest as an essential element of compensatory damages in a
wrongful death action governed by Illinois law.75 The court
now, which, together with what that sum will earn in the future, will equal the
amounts of the pecuniary benefits at the times in the future when they would
have been received.
70. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 34.03 (West 1971). D. DOBBS, supra note
31, § 3.5, at 178.
71. See Note, supra note 28, at 468.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 913A comment a (1977).
73. Trulter v. Moore, 113 I1. App. 3d 1011, 447 N.E.2d 1340 (1983); Schulz v. Rockwell
Mfg. Co., 108 11. App. 3d 113, 438 N.E.2d 1230 (1982); Gardner v. Geraghty, 98 Ill. App. 3d
10, 423 N.E.2d 1321 (1981).
74. 480 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (N.D. Il. 1979). Several cases originating from a May 1979
crash of an American Airlines DC-10 jet plane were consolidated for pretrial proceedings.
75. Id. at 1286.
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relied on the "fair and just compensation" language of the Illi-
nois Wrongful Death Act.76 Specifically, the court noted the
inequity of granting to defendant the benefit of discounting
future damages without a corresponding adjustment to plain-
tiffs recovery of past damages? 7 In a subsequent trial, the jury
found defendants liable, and the verdict, pursuant to the court's
instructions, included prejudgment interest calculated on the
entire award and accruing from the date of death. 78
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the damages award, relying, as the lower court
did, on the discounting-interest symmetry. 79 In dicta, court rec-
ognized that where future damages are discounted to the date of
trial, it may also be necessary to make a parallel adjustment for
the delay in receiving past losses.80 Where, as in this case, the
judge discounted the plaintiffs entire loss to the date of death,
the interest adjustment was necessary to bring the "death value"
to "present value".81
The appellate court stated that it would be improper to desig-
nate these damages as an award of "prejudgment interest."
Instead, it expressed these damages in terms of a present value
calculation,8 2 stating that the "so-called" prejudgment interest
76. Id. at 1285.
77. The court noted:
The law recognizes the earning potential of money by requiring that an award
for future damages such as lost future income be discounted to its present value.
It is inequitable to allow a defendant in a wrongful death action to obtain the
benefit of discounting any judgment to present value while not allowing a
plaintiff to obtain the benefit of prejudgment interest. Under the general rules
governing damages in a wrongful death action, a trier of fact takes into account
postjudgment interest and discounts any judgment to compensate for interest
which the plaintiff can earn on it. The benefit to the defendant of this account-
ing in determining damages is apparent. However, inequity obviously results if
the defendant gets the advantage of this accounting for postjudgment interest
but the plaintiff does not get the corresponding advantage of prejudgment
interest.
Id. at 1287.
78. In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 633,635 (7th Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 644-46. The court suggested that in the future all future damages should be
decreased by present value discounting and past damages should be augmented by inter-
est for the amount of income flow lost between death and the trial. Id. at 646.
80. The Seventh Circuit stated: "We find that the reasons for augmenting these 'past
losses' are exactly the same as those for discounting 'future losses'." Id. at 644.
81. Id.
82. "The formula should be clearly spelled out by the court in terms of present value,
not prejudgment interest. Once this calculation is done for present value at trial of both
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was just an element of the formula for calculation of compensa-
tory damages.8 3 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit rejected the
district court's ruling that prejudgment interest is recoverable
per se under Illinois law in wrongful death actions.8 4 Despite
these differences in terminology and disagreement over the ulti-
mate meaning of the language of the Illinois Wrongful Death
Act, the appellate court nonetheless recognized that the outcome
of its decision was "substantially the same" as the district
court's in awarding prejudgment interest,8 5 and that compensa-
tory damages did require awarding prejudgment interest, or its
equivalent, for the period of time prior to the judgment.86
Illinois state courts have refused to follow the Seventh Cir-
cuit's initiative. Instead, they have continued to reject the federal
court's unprecedented allowance of prejudgment or its equivalent
in Illinois wrongful death actions,8 7 and have likewise denied
any proposed expansion of the statute's scope in other ac-
tions.88 The Illinois legislature has been equally unwilling to
change the existing law. The Illinois Senate recently voted down
the proposed Illinois Senate Bill 087, which would have provided
for prejudgment interest commencing 180 days after the accrual
of a cause of action at a rate equal to one percentage point above
the federal discount rate for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chica-
go.89 Thus, despite the Seventh Circuit's holding in In Re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois plaintiffs are, as a rule,
unable to receive prejudgment interest damages in wrongful
death and personal injury actions.
past and future losses, plaintiff's arguments for prejudment interest as a separate ele-
ment of damages disappear." 644 F.2d at 646. For a more detailed analysis of In Re Air
Crash Disaster Near Chicago, see Note, supra 28, at 453.
83. The court recognized that the "present value at trial" represented the true com-
pensatory damages figure. To attain this sum, the court required "interest" to be added to
the "present value at death" sum for the time period between death and judgment, thus
offsetting the discounting of these damages. Id. at 64446.
84. Id. at 646.
85. Id. at 640.
86. Id. at 644.
87. See, e.g., Gardner v. Geraghty, 98 IM. App. 3d 10, 12, 423 N.E.2d 1321, 1324 (1981).
88. See Conway v. County Casualty Ins. Co., 92 Ill. 2d 388, 442 N.E.2d 245 (1982)
(insurance liability action); Schulz v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 108 Ill. App. 3d 113, 438 N.E.2d
1230 (1982) (personal injury action).
89. Proposed Illinois Senate Bill 087 would have amended § 2-1303 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to read, in relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 2-1303. Interest on judgment.
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DEVELOPING A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Resolution of the Debate Over Prejudgment Interest
In order for tort damages to achieve their primary purpose of
making plaintiff whole,90 they must address and compensate all
injuries proximately caused by defendant's culpable conduct.
Plaintiff has suffered a loss from the moment of injury, a loss
which is augmented by the withholding of the judgment sum
during the delay inherent in the judicial process. In addition, the
current Illinois practice whereby the courts discount defendant's
(a) Judgments recovered before any court after June 30, 1983 in actions filed
before July 1, 1983 shall draw interest at the rates certified by the State Treasurer
to the Courts Administrator on each July I and January 1 at 1 percentage point
above the federal discount rate, which is the rate of interest a commercial bank
pays to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Missouri, using a governmen-
tal bond ... as security, from the date of the judgment until satisfied.
(b) Judgments recovered before any court in actions filed after June 20, 1983,
except as provided in paragraph (c), shall draw interest at the rates provided in
paragraph (a) from the date the complaint is filed to the date of judgment and
such interest shall be determined in the manner prescribed in paragraph (a).
(d) Where a party seeking money damages does not accept a written offer filed
with the clerk of the court and served upon the attorney for the party seeking
damages more than 30 days prior to the commencement of trial and where such
party seeking damages fails to obtain a judgment in an amount more than the
total forfeit the prejudgment interest described in paragraph (b).
(e) When judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall
be computed at the above rate, from the time when made or rendered to the time
of entering judgment upon the same, and included in the judgment. The judg-
ment debtor may by tender of payment of judgment, costs and interest accrued
to the date of tender, stop the further accrual of interest on such judgment not-
withstanding the prosecution of appeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate or mod-
ify the judgment.
Senate Amendment No. 1 changed the Federal Reserve Bank location from Kansas City
to Chicago. Senate Amendment No. 2 allowed defendant to make a motion to suspend
prejudgment interest for periods of unreasonable delay by the plaintiff. Such delay must
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Senate Amendment No. 3 stated that pre-
judgment interest commences 180 days after the cause of action accrued. Senate Amend-
ment No. 4 excluded actions in small claims court from such interest damages.
The bill was defeated by a vote of 41-14 on May 27, 1983. The companion House Bill
713 was identical except for an amendment allowing for prejudment interest to run from
the time the cause of action accrued. The house bill was approved by the House Judiciary
Committee by a vote of 10-8 on April 11, 1984. A consideration of the bill before the full
House is pending as of this writing. I & II LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, LEGISLATIVE
SYNOPSIS AND DIGEST OF THE 1983 SESSION OF THE EIGHTY-THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(1983).
90. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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payments for future damages but do not augment defendant's
payments for past damages 91 is both unfair and logically incon-
sistent, as the Seventh Circuit, in In re Air Crash,92 convincingly
pointed out. The more desirable practice would be to recognize
uniformly the earning power of money over time, and to allocate
interest to plaintiff for injuries incurred prior to judgment while
providing defendent with an interest credit for prepayment of
damages for injuries incurred after the judgment.
The distinction between ascertainable and non-ascertainable
damages 93 is essentially irrelevant. Plaintiffs temporary depri-
vation of money owed to him by defendant, and the correspond-
ing loss of interest thereon, occurs whether the claim is liqui-
dated, readily ascertained, or incapable of being ascertained. By
virtue of the express purpose of tort damages, it is an injury for
which plaintiff is entitled to compensation. 94 Since an award of
prejudgment interest does no more than make defendant respon-
sible for all losses directly flowing from his act, it is more prop-
erly viewed as a legal obligation than a penalty.
In addition, opponents' contention that juries are already
implicitly awarding prejudgment interest without court instruc-
tion, is a double-edged sword. If juries have, in fact, indepen-
dently recognized the unfairness of awards without compensa-
tion for prejudgment delay, and are awarding ad hoc prejudgment
interest, the present lack of jury instructions leaves a jury with
virtually unbridled discretion in determining whether interest
should be awarded, and, if so, how much.95 As one noted com-
mentator maintains, uninstructed jurors are not likely to utilize
their discretion in this matter very wisely or consistently.96 A
properly drafted prejudgment interest statute could either take
91. See supra note 69.
92. See supra notes 74-86,
93. See supra notes 28-31.
94. Several commentators have recognized the compensatory purpose of prejudgment
interest. See Hare & Meelheim, supra note 20, at 81; Note, supra note 1, at 192; Note,
supra note 35, at 335; Note, supra note 28, at 453.
95. See Londrigan, supra note 2, at 65. "The Rand study seems to suggest that the
only way a plaintiff can be fairly compensated in Illinois is if a jury is willing to ignore
the unfairness of our present law and instead follow its conscience and common sense to
reach a just result" Id.
96. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 59 at 231. McCormick generally lacks confidence
in a jury's ability to exercise its discretion wisely in determining interest awards, even
with proper instruction.
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this damages element away from the jury while explaining to
the jurors that their award will be augmented by the court with
interest to compensate for the prejudgment period,97 or, alterna-
tively, authorize specific instructions to guide juries so that ver-
dicts will be more judiciously and uniformly awarded.98
Recommended Guidelines for Prejudgment Interest Awards
Proponents of expanding the awarding of prejudgment inter-
est argue that prejudgment interest furthers two goals: first,
compensating the plaintiff, the essential objective of all suits in
tort;99 and, second, expediting the judicial process by eliminat-
ing an incentive for defendant to delay.100 While both goals are
laudable in fashioning a just and effective prejudgment interest
law, primary emphasis must be placed on the compensatory
goal.101 A law which has case flow management as its main
purpose may result in unjust compensation 0 2 and even exacer-
bate problems of delay in adjudication. 0 3 Clear adherence to the
pre-eminence of the goal of compensation, however, will not only
assure a just result consistent with general tort law, but is also
more likely to ultimately achieve judicial efficiency. 10 4 Therefore,
an equitable and logical approach must focus on the injured
party and the loss that he has sustained. Specifically, the two
material elements of any prejudgment interest statute should
consist of the same standards as are used in determining com-
pensatory damages: the applicable portion of damages on which
the interest accrues, and the rate of compensatory interest.10 5
Past and Future Losses Should Be Distinguished
Since prejudgment interest compensates only for lost use of
97. See, e.g., N. J. Sup. CT. R. 4:42-11.
98. See infra notes 136, 137.
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
101. T. SEDGWICK, TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 28 (1972). "The declared
object is to give compensation to the party injured for the actual loss sustained." Id. See
also supra notes 7-9.
102. Compensatory damages focus on the plaintiff, seeking his full compensation, but
no more. See supra notes 8-11. Case flow management proposals often focus on the
defendant and his incentive to delay, and may overcompensate the plaintiff in order to
promote pretrial settlement. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 123-26.
104. See infra notes 127-29.
105. Note, supra note 35, at 335.
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money to which plaintiff is entitled, an authorizing statute
should also distinguish between past and future losses. Past
losses are those which are realized in the time period between the
injurious incident and the judgment, in contrast to future losses,
which include all losses resulting from the incident that will be
incurred but have not yet mainfested themselves at the time the
judgment is entered. It is clear that only past damages should
qualify for prejudgment interest, for those are the damages that
have already accrued and to which plaintiff is legally and factu-
ally entitled. Plaintiff has not lost the use of those funds not yet
due, and therefore does not require interest compensation for
their non-payment prior to judgment.10 6
In Re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago'0 7 suggests a min-
imally acceptable but inferior alternative for handling past ver-
sus future damages. In that case, the Seventh Circuit discounted
the entire damages award, including both past and future dam-
ages, back to the date of the incident. All damages, in effect,
became "past" damages, and thus due to plaintiff from the day
of the incident. The court then added prejudgment interest to the
discounted sum as a necessary consideration of present value
determinations. 10 8 Although the In Re Air Crash approach may
initially appear attractive, its application must be limited to
those situations where the discount rate is equal to the prejudg-
ment interest rate. 0 9 Any difference in these rates will result in
improper compensation of the plaintiff, thus defeating the pri-
mary purpose of prejudgment interest.1'0
The Prejudgment Interest Rate Should Reflect the Market
Turning to the second key element in a prejudgment interest
statute, the proper rate of interest to be applied, any proposed
statute must recognize that prejudgment interest attempts to
106. In fact, because plaintiff receives damages in presenti in payment for losses in
futuro, the courts in Illinois decrease his award according to present value principles. See
supra note 69.
107. 644 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
108. 644 F.2d at 646.
109. Id. at 644 n.19 (discussing Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d
583 (2d Cir. 1961)).
110. In fact, the Seventh Circuit itself only adopted the method it did because the
parties agreed to it. The court expressed a preference for the method that clearly differen-
tiates past and future damages. Id. at 646.
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compensate plaintiffs for actual lost investment earnings.11'
Thus, the interest rate should reflect returns from relevant alter-
natives in the actual marketplace. The available sum to be
invested and the duration of the investment should be consi-
dered.112 The relevant sum should be past damages, accruing
incrementally during the period of the dispute," 3 and the rele-
vant duration of investment should be the time period between
the accrual of the cause of action and the judgment. 14 Only by
considering market alternatives within these criteria can it be
assured that plaintiff is duly compensated without overcompen-
sating, and opponents' concerns that prejudgment interest causes
defendants to suffer a penalty are dispelled.
Analysis of Current Legislative Approaches
An analysis of two actual legislative efforts to enact provisions
for prejudgment interest damages illustrates how the failure to
adhere to compensatory principles in drafting these types of pro-
visions may result in ineffective or unjust awards. The Colorado
prejudgment interest statute"15 has been selected as representa-
111. See Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 353, 307 A.2d 571, 575 (1973) ("Here it [prejudg-
ment interest] is compensatory, to identify the claimant for the loss of what the monies
due him would presumably have earned if payment had not been delayed.").
112. See, e.g., supra note 120.
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114. To achieve full compensation for plaintiff, interest should accrue from the date
the cause of action accrued. One possible justification for delaying the commencement to
an arbitrary time after this date is to provide defendant with an interest free negotiation
period. Plaintiff is nonetheless injured during this period, and should be compensated.
This concept has been recognized by admiralty courts, which generally award interest
from the date of injury. See, e.g., United States v. M/V Zoe Colocotroni, 602 F.2d 12, 13-14
(1st Cir. 1979); Socony Mobile Oil Co. v. Texas Coastal & Int'l, Inc., 559 F.2d 1008, 1014
(5th Cir. 1977); Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. M/Y LaBelle Simone, 537 F.2d
1201, 1204 (4th Cir. 1976); Arkansas Valley Dredging Co. v. Mangolia Marine Transp.
Co., 469 F. Supp. 179, 187 (N.D. Miss. 1979); Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. American Commercial
Line, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 175, 177 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
115. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-101 (Supp. 1980) provides:
In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by
any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, corpor-
ation, association, or partnershp, whether by negligence or by willful intent of
such other person, corporation, association, or partnership and whether such
injury has resulted fatally or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the com-
plaint to claim interest on the damages alleged from the date said suit is filed;
and, on and after July 1, 1979, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to
claim interest on the damages claimed from the date the action acrued. When
such interest is so claimed, it is the duty of the court in entering judgment for
the plaintiff in such action to add the amount of damages assessed by the ver-
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tive of many other currently enacted state statutes. The recently
rejected Illinois Senate Bill 087116 will also be considered. 117
There are two key deficiencies in both the Colorado statute and
the Illinois bill which potentially mitigate their effectiveness.
First, neither piece of legislation distinguishes between past and
future damages. Inierest accrues on all damages, whether or not
they have yet been realized by the plaintiff. Because the plaintiff
is improperly earning interest on funds to which he is not yet
technically entitled, he is overcompensated to the extent of inter-
est earned on future damages. A secondary consequence of this
windfall is that the plaintiff benefits financially from delay in
litigation, thus creating an incentive to stall.
Second, neither the Colorado statute nor the Illinois bill pro-
vides for a prejudgment interest rate that accurately reflects
relevant market conditions. The Colorado statute provides for
nine percent interest to be compounded annually.118 It is argu-
able that nine percent is more than a compensatory rate of inter-
est, for there are few relevant market alternatives1 19 which yield
nine percent.120 Illinois Senate Bill 087 ties prejudgment interest
dict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on such amount calculated at the
rate of nine percent per annum on actions filed on or after July 1, 1975, and at
the legal rate on actions filed prior to such date, and calculated from the date
such suit was filed to the date of satisfying the judgment and to include the
same in said judgment as a part thereof. On actions filed on or after July 1,
1979, the calculation shall include compounding of interest annually from the
date such suit was filed.
116. See supra note 89.
117. The following table presents a comparative review of pertinent provisions:
Past/Future
Interest Rate: Accrues From: Differentiation:
Illinois 1.0% above federal 180 days after cause No
discount rate of action accrued
Colorado 9.0% time cause of No
action accrued
118. See also supra note 36.
119. Relevant alternatives would include investments involving like amounts of
money and time period of investment.
120. For example, key U.S. annual interest rates on February 23, 1984 were:
Prime Rate: 11% (base rate on corporate loans at large U.S. money center com-
mercial banks);
Passbook Savings Accounts: 5-1/2%;
Discount Rate: 8-1/2% (the charge on loans to depository institutions by the
New York Federal Reserve Bank);
Money Market Accounts: average rates unavailable;
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rates to the federal discount rate in an attempt to reflect market
interest rates. The federal discount rate, however, usually reflects
the whole interest market,121 rather than only plaintiff's rele-
vant investment market; it is the latter which should determine
the rate of his prejudgment interest. Moreover, the federal dis-
count rate may be manipulated to affect desired monetary and
credit policies, and thus often does not reflect actual interest
markets. 122 The Illinois bill is a step in the right direction, but it
fails to isolate from the range of rates available in the market
those rates that are returns on viable investment alternatives for
the average plaintiff investor. Thus, there is the potential for
substantial deviation from the goal of proper compensation for
actual injuries sustained.
One probable rationale for higher-than-relevant-market pre-
judgment interest rates is that prejudgment interest statutes are
being used to stimulate defendants to settle, 23 in effect encour-
Commerical Paper: High-grade unsecured notes sold through dealers by major
corporations in multiples of $1,000:9-1/2% 30 days, 9-1/2% 60 days;
Certificates of Deposit: 9-1/2% one month, 9-1/2% two months, 9-3/4% three
months, 9-3/4% six months, 10-1/8% one year; (typical rates paid by major banks on
new issues of negotiable C.D.'s, usually on amounts of $1 million and more; the min-
imum unit is $100,000.00);
Treasury Bills: Results of the Tuesday, February 21, 1984, auction of short-term
U.S. government bills, sold at a discount from face value in units of $10,000 to $1
million, 9.13% 13 weeks, 9.28% 26 weeks.
Wall St. J., February 24, 1984, at 30, col. 3.
The Oklahoma Statute provides for an interest rate of 15% for personal injury actions.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 727.2 (Supp. 1983). Any analysts who might question whether Colo-
rado's 9% rate is unreasonably high would undoubtedly concede the point with respect to
Oklahoma.
121. J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 54 (1976). "The discount rate is usually set to follow the
market." Id.
122. Id. at 51-65. The discount rate is one of the weapons the Federal Reserve utilizes
to effect its policies. Therefore, the discount rate at any one time may reflect the actual
market rate or the Federal Reserve Board's desired market rate.
123. See Bond v. City of Huntington, 276 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1981), in which the court
expressed its disapproval of setting prejudgment interest with the goal of effectuating
settlement: "We do not preceive that prejudgment interest should be utilized in a context
foreign to its historical purpose regardless of the benign goal sought." Id. at 548. See also
Kotzia v. Barr, 81 N.J. 360, 408 A.2d 131 (1979). The court therein followed the New
Jersey Supreme Court's statement that the New Jersey prejudgment interest statute does
not apply where a judgment is entered following a settlement, but only where the judg-
ment is made as a result of a trial. Id. at 360, 408 A.2d at 134. The court's rationale was
that to award prejudgment interest without a trial would be contrary to the spirit of the
law. This suggests that the court views the compensatory purpose as subordinate to case
flow considerations. 95 N.J.L.J. Index 341 (1972), quoted in Kotzia, 81 N.J. at 360, 408
A.2d 134.
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aging defendants to forego their right to have a jury determine
the extent of liability. In their attempts to effect a greater
number of settlements, some overzbalous jurisdictions may be
requiring defendants to pay more than their actual liability.
Whatever the stated purpose in such jurisdictions, their pre-
judgment interest awards cannot be entirely justified as compen-
satory damages. Rather, the amount of interest in excess of
compensation interest is more analogous to punitive damages,
the purpose of which is deterrence and punishment. 124 Thus, by
attempting to give primary importance to what should be the
secondary goal of case flow management, such jurisdictions may
be penalizing defendants for exercising their rights.
It should be stressed that although an undue emphasis on the
goal of expediting case flow can result in sacrificing the all-
important goal of compensation, the converse is not necessarily
true. A prejudgment interest statute that gives pre-eminence to
the goal of compensation can also serve as a catalyst to better
case flow. All that is required is that the prejudgment interest
rate reflect the actual relevant market as closely as possible. If
the statutory rate is greater than market rates, plaintiffs may
profit from delaying judgment; by contrast, a rate approximat-
ing market rates would eliminate this profit and the related
financial incentive to delay. In fact, since prejudgment interest
accrues only until there is a judgment,125 plaintiff remains un-
certain of the eventual award. Furthermore, he is denied cash
flow during the accrual period. Such realities may provide plain-
tiff with an incentive to seek prompt legal action rather than
delay, while still ensuring full compensation.
As a further incentive to the prompt disposition of a case, the
payment of the judgment in the form of a lump sum may avail a
plaintiff of previously unreachable investment opportunities of-
fering higher yields than the rate of prejudgment interest based
only on past damages. Realistically, the lump sum satisfaction
of the claim may break down a minimum term or deposit barrier,
or allow the plaintiff to take a greater risk on an investment
offering potential returns in excess of the compensatory amount.126
For this reason, delay in obtaining a judgment could work
124. C. McCORMICK, supra note 14, § 77, at 275.
125. See Note, supra note 28, at 453 n.1.
126. See, e.g., supra note 120.
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against the best interests of the plaintiff, provided that the pre-
judgment interest rate is reasonably related to relevant market
rates.
PROPOSAL
As previously discussed, it is not uncommon for jurisdictions
to fail to emphasize the compensatory purpose of prejudgment
interest, to fail to distinguish between past and future damages,
and to fail to set interest rates reflective of relevant markets.
127
All three failures have serious consequences. The first two, how-
ever, may be corrected relatively easily. The third problem, that
of determining the proper rate for prejudgment interest, is a
knottier question, as evidenced by the widely varying rates of
interest in different jurisdictions. 128 This note therefore proposes
three interest rate options that more accurately reflect the com-
pensatory purpose of prejudgment interest damages. 129 Each of
the three proposals takes into account the factors affecting the
availability of investment instruments yielding different interest
returns, including the amount to be deposited, desired liquidity,
and the duration of the investment. The proposals also accom-
modate the dynamics of deregulation in the savings industry, a
development which is providing greater opportunities and higher
yields for investors at all income levels.130 The three options are:
a weighted average method; an evidence method; and a fixed
statutory rate based upon statistically evidenced preferences.
Weighted Average Method
Under the weighted average method, a prejudgment interest
statute would require a state treasurer to compute the average
interest earned by non-commercial investors based on statistics
regularly compiled and published by the regulators of commer-
cial banks and thrift institutions. 31 Existing statistics denom-
127. See supra notes 36,115-26 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 36.
129. Illinois courts have consistently followed the Illinois Supreme Court's holding in
Beach v. Peabody, 188 Ill. 75, 58 N.E. 679 (1900), that interest is a creature of statute. Id.
at 79, 58 N.E. at 683. Thus, legislative authorization would be necessary for Illinois courts
to carry out any of these proposals.
130. See generally UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, THE '83 SAVINGS
AND LOAN SOURCEBOOK 6 (1983).
131. The Federal Reserve Board publishes monthly statistics pertaining to interest
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inate the total dollars that non-commercial investors invest in
various types of instruments such as certificates of deposit and
treasury bills. Each of these instruments carries a different rate
of return. A weighted average could be calculated as follows:
1) Calculate each instrument's proportional share of all
non-commercial investment dollars.
2) Multiply each type of instrument's interest rate by the
fraction representing its proportional share of all non-
commercial investment dollars.
3) Add together the results for each type of instrument.
4) Divide the sum by the number of investment instru-
ment types considered. The result will be a weighted
average interest rate.132
The calculation of the weighted average interest rate would be
performed by the court. The jury would be instructed that it
should not include any allowance for prejudgment interest, be-
cause the court would add such interest to any verdict they
might deliver.133 A disadvantage to the weighted average method
is that it may become increasingly impractical to compute as
deregulation continues to lift restrictions on savings institutions
rates available at federally insured institutions in the Federal Reserve Bulletin. The Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") publishes like statistics for Federal Savings
Associations and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Member Institutions
in its monthly publication, the FHLBB JouRNAL.
132. Assume, for example, four viable investment instruments (A, B, C, and D). They
earn 5%, 6%, 7%, and 8% interest respectively, and have on deposit at the time of the State
Treasurer's accounting $1 billion, $2 billion, $3 billion, and $4 billion respectively. The
weighted average rate would be calculated as follows:
("Total deposits" = A+B+C+D = $10 billion)
("i" = interest rate)
i =[A deposits ] [(iA] + [B deposits I (iB) +
[Total deposits] [Total deposits]
[C deposits ] [(iC] + [D deposits 1 (iD)
[Total deposits] [Total deposits]
= [(1 ) (.05)] + [(2 ) (.06)] + [(3 ) (.07)] + [(4 ) (.08)]
10 10 10 10
.005 + .012 + .021 + .032
.07
Therefore, the rate certified by the State Treasurer in this example would be seven
percent.
133. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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and to allow individual institutions to set their own rates to meet
individual deposit needs. 34 With the assistance of regulatory
agencies that compile investment statistics, and statistics on
average past damages awards and case disposition time, 3 5 an
accurate and comprehensive determination may nonetheless be
feasible.
Evidence Method
The evidence method would bestow upon the jury, in whose
province the determination of damages normally lies, 136 the duty
to weigh evidence on the issue of prejudgment interest. The par-
ties would argue from evidence presented on this point, as with
any element of damages. The jury, properly instructed by the
court, would then determine the interest due to plaintiff in each
particular case.
At trial, evidence would be presented showing the plaintiffs
past investment patterns. Expert testimony on available rele-
vant investment alternatives, given the approximate size of
plaintiffs claim and the particular time period involved, could
also be presented. The court would then instruct the jury that the
plaintiff may have suffered a substantial loss by reason of the
lost use of money, thus allowing the jury to decide the issue of
whether the plaintiff has actually been damaged by this depri-
vation. If the jury decides this issue affirmatively, the determina-
tion of a compensatory rate of interest would then also fall to the
jury.
Present procedural safeguards will allow the court to supervise
and set aside an obvious abuse of this discretion, 137 but ordinar-
ily the jury would have the same discretion as in other damage
award determinations. One commentator has suggested that the
evidence method may entrust too much discretion to the jury. 38
One result could be inconsistent verdicts and the attendant
undesirable consequence of constant judicial intervention. The
134. See generally, UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS INSTrrUTIONS, supra note 130.
135. See supra note 120.
136. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 6, at 24-28; T. SEDGWICK, supra note 101, at 21.
137. ILu. REV. STAT., ch. 110A, 306 (1981). This motion empowers the trial court to
exercise its discretion to grant a new trial on the grounds of an excessive damages award.
A new trial may also be granted on damages alone where the damage issue is so separa-
ble and distinct from the issue of liability that a trial on it alone may be had without
injustice. Hartseil v. Culligan, 40 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1070,353 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1976).
138. C. McCormick, supra note 14, § 56, at 225.
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same criticism, however, might be leveled at all jury awards.
Furthermore, it is contrary to the judicially recognized presump-
tion that jurors are competent in everything pertaining to the
ordinary and common knowledge of mankind. 39
Fixed Statutory Rate
A final alternative is to set a statutory rate at a rate of return
slightly above returns offered by passbook savings accounts. As
of January 1984, a reasonable rate would be approximately six
percent. 140 The fixed rate option makes sense in part because
most United States households hold passbook savings accounts,
while a much smaller proportion of households use other types of
investment instruments.141 Deregulation may continue to cause
funds to flow out of passbook accounts into higher yielding but
riskier or less liquid investments, 142 but it is a fair assumption
that a majority of households will continue to hold passbook
accounts. Certainly no other single financial option has achieved
the same popularity among non-commercial investors. If a
majority of the members of households, all potential plaintiffs,
are earning interest that a passbook account yields, then that
fact should be reflected in the compensatory rate.143
The fixed rate method also makes sense because the American
public does not invest a significant portion of its assets,' 44 nor
does it always invest in the highest yielding instrument avail-
able. A prejudgment interest rate reflecting the maximum avail-
able interest on 100% of the underlying damages would be based
139. People ex. rel. Adams v. Kite, 48 Ill. App. 3d 828, 833,363 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1977).
140. On Jan. 3, 1984, the interest rate ceiling for passbook accounts was 5.5% annu-
ally. Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983.
141. As of, July 1982, 75% of U.S. households held passbook savings accounts. By
contrast, no more than 18% of the households surveyed used any other type of investment
instrument. McKenzie & Winger, Who is the Thrift User?, FHLBB J. 2 (Jan. 1983).
142. Olin, Changes in Deposit Account Structures: September 1982 - March 1983,
FHLBB J. 32 (Aug. 1983).
143. The fact that the interest rate on passbook accounts is artificially low due to
federal regulation is immaterial to this analysis, for it is only the fact that a majority of
people are earning this rate of interest, rather than whether they are content with it, that
determines what is fair and true compensation.
144. United States Department of Commerce statistics estimated the 1982 disposable
personal income at $2,172.5 billion, of which $540.8 billion, or about 25%, was estimated
to have been invested in tangible and financial assets. UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAV-
INGS INSTITUTIONS, supra note 130, at 17.
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on the unrealistic assumption that the claimants, unlike the vast
majority of their fellow citizens, would have invested all the
damages with such skill as to yield interest returns above nor-
mal savings account returns.145 As with the weighted average
method, the jury would be specifically instructed to refrain from
implicitly awarding any prejudgment interest, because the court
would apply a just rate to any verdict they might return.
A statutorily fixed prejudgment rate quantifies investment
realities into a standard compensatory rate. It may be criticized
as too conservative, and for failing to take into account the indi-
vidual investment patterns of plaintiffs, who often range from
retired working class couples to sophisticated and wealthy busi-
ness executives. Thus, just compensation in a given case may be
compromised in the interests of simplicity and predictability.
Nonetheless, the fixed rate method may present the best com-
promise between the real loss suffered by the plaintiff caused by
the lost use of money recovered as past damages and the need
for judicial economy.
CONCLUSION
Prejudgment interest should be permitted in all tort actions in
Illinois to implement the basic goal of tort law, to make the
plaintiff whole. The judicial history of prejudgment interest in
Illinois illustrates that assistance will not be forthcoming from
the state courts, which have exercised strict judicial restraint by
allowing such prejudgment interest damages only where ex-
pressly authorized by statute. Therefore, any relief from the pre-
sent state of affairs must come from the legislature.
The drafters of prejudgment interest legislation should focus
their attention on the primary goal of plaintiff's full compensa-
tion, resisting the temptation to overemphasize the laudable but
purely secondary consideration of case flow management. Pre-
judgment interest is a substantive right of plaintiffs and should
not be sacrificed in an attempt to promote settlements and clear
up court backlogs. Legislators should therefore include two ele-
ments in any proposed prejudgment interest statute: first, pre-
judgment interest applied only to past damages and running
145. See Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd,
370 U.S. 937 (1962).
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from the time the cause of action accrued; and second, a genuinely
compensatory rather than punitive rate of interest that reflects
actual relevant interest rates. Three methods have been proposed
for implementing this last objective: the weighted average meth-
od, the evidence method, and the fixed rate method. The ultimate
choice will depend on the drafters' weighing of the relative
advantages and disadvantages of each.
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